RESEARCH ARTICLE

Civil Society and Domestic Politics in International Relations: Lessons from Global Climate Governance

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Abstract: The creation of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), seemed to place climate norm front and center in terms of global governance. Yet it was not until Paris in 2015 that 195 countries finally reached an agreement on further cooperation. The Paris Agreement opened a new phase in global climate governance by replacing the top-down manner of centrally imposed targets and timetables of the Kyoto Protocol, with the institutionalization of a voluntary, decentralized bottom-up "Pledge and Review" system. Thus, understanding how each Party state responds to climate norms and why it responds such ways is essential to further facilitate global collective efforts to curb global warming. Furthermore, as states are composed of many different actors with possibly conflicting interests, this requires the investigation of their domestic decision-making processes and the influences of domestic constituencies and politics. In order for the processes initiated by the Paris Agreement to make a further significant difference to global climate change, this paper advocates the application of "socialization processes." It argues that the international community has been socialized into accepting global climate norms, and that facilitating further socialization can help the operation of the pledge and review system by encouraging each Party to comply. It then turns to domestic factors and their impact on the implementation of global norms, further arguing that the socialization of elite bureaucrats is insufficient to deter deviation from the norm; rather, socialization of empowered domestic constituencies is required.

Keywords: Climate Politics, Global Climate Governance, Domestic Politics in International Relations, Socialization

Although global discussion on climate change has only recently gained wide attention, the international norm of "environmental stewardship" has centuries-old roots (Buzan & Falkner, in press). The landmark 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Rio de Janeiro, seemed to place this international norm front and center in terms of global governance. Yet it was not until Paris in 2015, after more than two decades of deadlock since the creation of the UNFCCC, that 195 countries finally reached an agreement on further cooperation. The Paris Agreement opened a new phase in global climate governance by replacing the top-down manner of centrally imposed targets and timetables of the Kyoto Protocol, with the institutionalization of a voluntary, decentralized bottom-up "Pledge and Review" system. The Paris Agreement ended a "misguided approach of establishing mandatory emission reductions" and

"acknowledges the primacy of domestic politics in climate change" (Falkner, 2016, p. 1107). As Keohane and Oppenheimer (2016, pp. 147–150) noted, the Pledge and Review system is designed to create a "two-level game" that explicitly incorporates domestic politics into global climate discussion by demanding each Party state to pledge domestically determined levels of contributions and self-review their commitments.

For the Paris Agreement to make a further significant difference to global climate change, means need to be found, in the absence of enforcement mechanisms, that will successfully translate the international pledges of states into their domestic policy formulation. This paper advocates the application of "socialization processes," which appeared successful in the international arena and resulted in the Paris Agreement, to the domestic arena, in order to internalize climate norms into domestic constituencies.

Since the creation of the UNFCCC, we have observed both convergence and divergence of states' behavior. The converging behavioral tendency can be perceived as the results of international socialization outlined in the work of English School rationalists such as Hedley Bull (1977), as well as the top-down social constructivism of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), Keck and Sikkink (1998), and Risse and Sikkink (1999). Divergence from the norm is often explained by taking into consideration domestic factors (Putnam, 1988; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Cortell & Davis, 1996; Checkel, 1997). Hence Ted Hopf (1998, p. 176) has identified how, by making interests a central variable, "constructivism explores not only how particular interests come to be, but also why many interests do not."

In explaining both convergence and divergence, it appears essential to depart from the traditional state-centric approaches and the "states as unitary actors" assumption and to note the significance of non-state actors who play instrumental roles in norm-setting and norm-dissemination, both in domestic as well as international politics for climate change. The process of socialization, by which global rules and norms are disseminated and internalized by members of international society, has the capacity to impact all entities, including non-state actors. Thus, analysis of

the process, as well as a policy prescription, should occur not only at the inter-state level but at all national and sub-national levels to consolidate the operation of the voluntary governance regime.

This paper looks back on the evolution of the climate governance, including underlying factors that had hampered progress and the innovations that made the breakthrough possible in Paris. It then identifies elements that can consolidate operation of the self-enforcing Pledge and Review system under the Paris Agreement, in order to encourage domestic policy changes in each party state to reduce significantly the CO2 emissions. This paper argues that the international community has been socialized into accepting global climate norms, and that facilitating further socialization can help the operation of the Pledge and Review system by encouraging each Party to comply. It then turns to domestic factors and their impact on the implementation of global norms, further arguing that the socialization of elite bureaucrats is insufficient to deter deviation from the norm; rather, socialization of empowered domestic constituencies is required. The analysis concludes with brief comments on the implications of global climate governance.

Challenges of Global Climate Governance

Global climate change is such a hot topic, both literally and figuratively, that the contemporary era has been called the "Age of the Anthropocene" a timeframe when the greatest impact on mankind's natural operating environment is Man himself. Much of this impact has been negative, an unfortunate bi-product of modernization and development. Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to the consequences of Man's negative impact upon the environment, and in many cases are experiencing an uptick in the frequency and devastation of disasters which, due to the role of human agency, can be considered "nature-induced" rather than "natural."

The evidence of human-induced climate change and the damages caused by it have been well documented (UN Environment Programme, 2015). Climate change poses threats to states. It poses direct existential threats to small island states. It also existentially threatens vulnerable groups and

individuals in other states, due to increased frequency, devastation, and proliferation to previously safe areas of natural disasters (Howe & Bang, 2017). Moreover, states face indirect security repercussions caused by climate change, such as those related to migration and refugee flows. For instance, in 2007, Australian Federal Police Commissioner Mick Keelty identified climate change and food insecurity in the Asia-Pacific region as the greatest security threats faced by Australia as they would force an exodus of refugees to seek illegal residence in Australia, further exacerbating social unrest (Lauder, 2007). As importantly, climate change threatens the security of vulnerable individuals: those who are most affected by climate change are often the most marginalized groups in society with fewer resources and means to cope with environmental degradation and any harm caused by it.

Therefore, the world needs collective action between states to address climate change, which is also an imperative of contemporary aspirations for good global governance. The international community has begun to see security threats not only between, but also within states, and focus on people in addition to states. This has posed a challenge to traditional concepts of security, which have been almost exclusively concerned with territorial integrity and national sovereignty. It is in this context that the term "human security" was born to shed light on the significance of security at the level of individuals. The changing understanding of security was also driven by many developing countries that were sensitive to any threats to their already fragile national identity after their recent independence (United Nations Development Programme, 1994, p. 22).

The climate change agenda, however, entails some features that make it hard for the international community to cooperate. First, exclusion from consumption of benefits that the environment brings is not possible, which gives everyone an incentive to free-ride and enjoy the benefits without paying the price necessary to secure them. This has been modeled as a "Tragedy of the Commons." Olson (1965, p. 2) argued that groups of individuals with a common interest will not act in cooperation to achieve the common interest, but rather will seek self-interest because there is no incentive to share the cost. Hardin's (1968) solution to the Tragedy of the Commons is that either the state or the market should intervene. Nevertheless, for the global commons like climate change, there is no world government that can play the role of the state as in the local commons problem. Ostrom (1990) challenged Olson's (1965) and Hardin's (1968) pessimism. Ostrom (1990) observed from real-world practices that people around a common resource communicate and voluntarily participate in finding solutions and make rules for managing the common resource.

In addition to the Tragedy of the Commons, which concerns equitable enjoyment of the benefits of collective action, the issue of how to share the burden of the costs is the inherent cause of conflicts in international climate change negotiations, distinguishing it from other global agendas. Developed countries and developing countries have been arguing over fair share of the burden. Each country has different perceptions concerning equity and fairness; even inside the country each actor may have different perceptions, possibly failing to reach a domestic consensus (Falkner, 2016, p. 1110). These features in relation to climate change need to be taken into consideration in the discussion of global climate governance because they are key to understanding the challenges faced and why domestic politics plays such a key role.

Despite the inherent challenges, the mounting evidence of global warming and warnings of its potential dire effects stimulated the international community to engage in collective action on climate change. In 1992, countries agreed to create the UNFCCC, as a focus for international cooperation to combat the impact of man-made climatic modifiers through limiting average global temperature increases. The UNFCCC entered into force on 21 March 1994. The 197 countries that have ratified the Convention are called Parties to the Convention.

By 1995, countries had launched negotiations to strengthen the global response to climate change and many adopted the Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol's first commitment period started in 2008 and ended in 2012. The second commitment period began on 1 January 2013 and will end in 2020 (Gupta, 2010).

In the Kyoto Protocol, only industrialized countries (Annex 1) have quantified mitigation commitments. These Annex I countries, however, cover less than 50% of global carbon dioxide emissions. More than three-quarters of energy-related CO_2 emission growth was expected to come from China, India, and the Middle East; and around 97% of the growth from non-OECD countries (International Energy Agency, 2008, pp. 382–406). The exemption of developing countries—with China becoming a major exporter of goods to the US—became a key reason for the reluctance of the US to ratify the Protocol (Lisowski, 2002, p. 107). In the end, the United States refused to ratify the Protocol; Russia held out opportunistically for favorable treatment; Australia delayed ratification for 10 years; and some ratifying countries, such as Canada, failed to comply with their commitments or eventually withdrew (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010).

The dead-end of the Kyoto protocol was expected to be tackled by a new agreement to be made at the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP) in Copenhagen, but with the rejection by main emitters such as the US, China, and India, the world had to wait a few more years until COP 21 in Paris. Meanwhile, members of the international community prepared a new form of governance mechanism, based on the lessons learned from the failures of the Kyoto Protocol and the negotiations in Copenhagen (Bäckstrand, Kuyper, Linnér, & Lövbrand, 2017; Victor, 2016). The Paris Agreement seeks to accelerate and intensify the actions and investment needed for a sustainable low carbon future. Its central aim is to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change by keeping a global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius. The Agreement also aims to strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change (Falkner, 2016).

The Paris Agreement obliges all parties to "prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve" (UNFCCC, 2015, Article 4, Paragraph 2) and to "communicate a nationally determined contribution

every five years" (UNFCCC, 2015, Article 4, Paragraph 9). It also specifies that developed and developing countries alike "are encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national circumstances" (UNFCCC, 2015, Article 4, Paragraph 4).

In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol's targets and timetable-led, top-down governance, under the Paris Agreement, each Party voluntarily commit to the levels that are domestically acceptable, but they do not have to keep their pledge, as long as they "shall *pursue* domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions" (UNFCCC, 2015, Article 4, Paragraph 2). They are expected to "periodically take stock of the implementation of this Agreement to assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of this Agreement and its long-term goals" (UNFCCC, 2015, Article 14, Paragraph 1). The first formal review, referred to in the agreement as the "global stocktake" (UNFCCC, 2015, Article 14, Paragraph 1), is scheduled for 2023, with subsequent review report submitted every five years thereafter (UNFCCC, 2015, Article 14, Paragraph 2). This "discretion and vagueness" (Keohane & Oppenheimer, 2016, pp. 146–147) facilitated the negotiation process significantly. Each Party of the Paris Agreement needs to pledge, but all they have to do is to "review" every five years and demonstrate their "efforts" to mitigate and meet their pledges (Falkner, 2016, p. 1108; Koehane & Oppenheimer, 2016).

Observations from Global Climate Governance

We can draw some observations from the past experiences in global climate governance and the responses of different actors. First, climate norms have changed states' behavior. From Copenhagen to Paris, the behavior of states shows a remarkable convergence, although why states comply with norms requires further analysis. China's and India's responses in Paris are a good example. These two countries are two of the world's largest polluters, and they were the main stumbling blocks for the

agreements in Copenhagen. However, both China and India announced their commitment to the Paris Agreement, and criticized President Trump's announcement of the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in June 2017 (Milman, Smith, Carrington, McCarthy, & Siddiqui, 2017).

China had for many years resisted pleas by the international community for it to cap its rapidly rising emissions and had argued that developed countries have to do more to reduce their emissions and to assist developing countries financially and technologically with climate mitigation and adaptation (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010; Heggelund, Andresen, & Buan, 2010). In 2009 in Copenhagen, China announced that it was not prepared to take on an emissions reduction commitment, but it would reduce its energy intensity by 40 to 45% of the 2005 levels by 2020, expand its use of non-fossil fuels to about 15%, and increase forest cover by 40 million hectares (Heggelund et al., 2010). China's announcement in the lead up to the Paris negotiations, that it was now prepared to peak its emissions around 2030, thus represented a significant change from the past.

China became the world's largest emitter, surpassing US emission levels in 2006 (Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010). This makes it increasingly difficult to place exclusive blame for climate change on the West. But why should the People's Republic of China worry about international norms and/or charges of hypocrisy? For English school rationalists, the answer to why China seems intent on cultivating a reputation as a good global citizen can be found in the concept of an international "society" the rules and norms of which have a "civilizing" influence upon its members, rather than an international system governed by the logic of survival and self-help.

For Hedley Bull (1977, p. 13), "a society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions." Bull and Watson (1984, p. 1) further noted that a group of independent political communities (states) can move beyond merely forming a system, "in the sense that the behavior of each

is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, to establishing, by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and by recognizing their common interest in maintaining these arrangements." They also argued that "normative" and "institutional" factors create a unique "logic" for that particular international society (p. 9). Likewise, for Martha Finnemore (1996, p. 128), "the fact that we live in an international society means that what we want and, in some ways, who we are shaped by the social norms, rules, understandings, and relationships we have with others. These social realities are as influential as material realities in determining behavior. Indeed, they are what endow material realities with meaning and purpose." Yet this international socialization in of itself is insufficient to explain the complex mechanisms of global environmental politics.

The second observation is that, under conditions of a Tragedy of the Commons, it is important to maintain the engagement of those who have the greatest capacity to impact on the collective action and secure their compliance with global norms. In this case, what is crucial in the operation of the post-Paris system is to dissuade major emitters from withdrawing from the agreement, and this paper argues, this can only be done through the leverage of internal as well as external normative constituencies. As Ostrom (2012, p. 355) has pointed out, "global solutions, negotiated at a global level, if not backed up by a variety of efforts at national, regional, and local levels—are not guaranteed to work effectively." When states agree at the international negotiation tables without a sufficient domestic consensus or support, deviation is likely to occur. This was what happened in the Kyoto Protocol and, in the contemporary operating environment, with regard to the US. President Trump considered that the Paris Accord did not conform to his stated "America First" foreign policy as it would limit his administration's ability to arrange domestic environmental laws as per the country's needs. He decided to stop American contributions to climate finance, as he argued that the Paris Agreement will only reduce the global temperature a "tiny, tiny amount" because the deal is not tough enough on countries like India and China (Milman et al., 2017). Although China and India have distanced themselves from the position of the

US after President Trump's announcement, they are, nevertheless, still answerable to domestic constraints when keeping the pledges they make, rendering their commitment fragile.

Domestic factors have clearly shaped China's changing stance on climate action. China is experiencing severe pollution problems and growing civil dissatisfaction with pollution levels (Stensdal, 2015). Air pollution has reached crisis levels mainly due to the dramatic increases in automobiles, continued heavy reliance on coal, and the growing demand for oil (Heggelund et al., 2010). China is also concerned about long-term energy security, thus, has strong incentives to promote alternative sources of energy and energy efficiency (Heggelund et al., 2010). The Chinese government further sees considerable innovation potential linked to the greening of the economy, and the development and export of green technologies, as an argument in favor of modernization and the cutting down in inefficient industries, which otherwise would be politically more challenging (Schreurs, 2016).

This points to the fact that states should not be treated as unitary actors, in particular with regard to issues such as climate change. Yet when an issue tends to divide the public view and a consensus is not reached, a platform of discussion is required to reach a domestic consensus before going forward to international negotiation tables. This is reminiscent of Putnam's (1988) two-level game, but a distinction should be made in the climate change issue, as the consensus required is not among the *elites* or powerful interest groups, but rather among the newly informed general public that can change the positions of the elites who represent them at the international negotiation table.

The deviation between the elites and the public has most obviously been occurring in states where a well-developed civil society is present, such as in the US. Transnational advocacy networks need to target the public of countries, as well as the elites in government, because in democracies it is the citizens who put the officials in the position of power to make decisions on their behalf. Yet even in undemocratic states, or those which may be termed hybrid regimes that exist somewhere between the two poles on the democratic-authoritarian axis, the role of the public

in diplomacy has received a tremendous boost as a result of the revolution in communications and information technology, leading to a democratization of information.

This is particularly the case in East Asia, a region traditionally seen as the most state-centric, despite Asian states remaining among the most ardent champions of Westphalian sovereignty (Acharya 2003). David Shambaugh (2008) noted that the interconnectivity of societies in East Asia has manifested Putnam's two-level game model. "New Preachers," NGOs, and civil society community activists have sprouted in many countries in the region to uphold humanitarian causes and to pressure governments and corporations (Chanda, 2008). These activists have also linked with international bodies and fellow activists in other countries for coordination and support, with authoritarian states challenged by the mutually reinforcing trends of the constant diffusion of information and the rise of civil society activism. Thus, for Nicholas Cull (2013, p. 17), "the significance of publics in foreign policy may be the defining characteristic of foreign policy in our age."

Hence, Karl Deutsch (1978) has referenced a simple cascade model of national decision-making consisting of five levels, each level a distinct reservoir of public or elite opinion and each reservoir linked to a complex of social institutions and status groups. The first of these is the social and economic elite, which does not form a simple monolithic group, but rather is connected by a dense net of multiple ties, links, and channels of communication. The second is the political and governmental elite, which is also not monolithic. Third, we have the media of mass communication; fourth, the network of local opinion leaders, and fifth, the politically relevant strata of the population at large. Streams of information move downward in cascade fashion, from higher-level communications systems to lower-level ones.

The third observation is that non-state actors, not only civil society and social movements, but also economic actors (business and trade union) and sub-national or sub-state actors (regional local governments, cities, and municipalities), have been key in norm-dissemination and putting pressures on states to cooperate for climate change. Transnational

advocacy networks have always been active in the area of environment (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Hale, 2016). Their activities have, however, been more visible since US President George W. Bush's withdrawal from the Kyoto protocol and have intensified since the disappointments in Copenhagen (Bäckstrand et al., 2017). Since COP 21 in Paris, these non-state actors have been invited to play a "more integrated role in multilateral processes" and their engagement in the UNFCCC process has been formally and informally, institutionalized (Bäckstrand et al., 2017). The new climate regime aims to bring cities and subnational governments, businesses, and other non-state actors into its very core (Hale, 2016). Furthermore, the Paris Agreement set out larger roles of non-state actors: an expert-composed committee that will "facilitate implementation and promote compliance" "in a manner that is transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive" (UNFCCC, 2015, Article 15, Paragraph 1–2); and various subsidiary bodies for scientific and technical advice (UNFCCC, 2015, Article 18).

The Tragedy of the Commons and the public good nature of climate change, as well as the inherent conflicts over cost-sharing, makes global climate change governance particularly challenging. Voluntary, bottom-up governance approaches are imperative for the engagement of major emitters. Many scholars have advocated this, but it has gained currency only after the failure of top-down governance attempts in Copenhagen (Cole, 2015; Jordan et al., 2015; Keohane & Victor, 2016). As has been summed up by von Stein (2008, p. 243),

> relatively soft law often garners widespread participation, but it creates few concrete incentives for states to improve behavior. Harder commitments make shirking more difficult, but these institutional features may deter from joining the very states whose practices are least consistent with the treaty's requirements.

It is essential to include every major emitter and as long as the conflicting interests among them persist, it is inevitable to have a non-binding agreement as in the Paris Agreement.

The Pledge and Review system of the Paris Agreement embodies the nature of climate change, as a compromised form of global governance in order to engage with main emitters. Given the global climate governance system, policies need to be pursued for each Party state to keep the pledges domestically. The search for policy instruments requires inquiries into why states comply and what conditions are necessary to facilitate compliance. The next two sections discuss these issues to narrow down the necessary policy tools to promote successful operation of the Pledge and Review system.

Two Competing Views: Why Comply?

Despite the commonality between them, rationalists and constructivists present two distinct views on the optimal global governance mechanisms. Deriving testable implications on why states comply with international norms and testing them empirically could guide future global governance system. This section elaborates testable implications in the context of global climate norms and the next section discusses why domestic politics and civil society mobilization are needed to facilitate compliance.

By now there is less dispute over the fact that norms matter despite realists' claim that norms have no causal impacts on states. The issue is more about how to implement accepted norms. The last two decades in global efforts to limit climate change have demonstrated that climate norms matter as states have joined forces in global collective efforts to limit global warming. Keohane & Victor (2016) categorized the form of governance mechanism depending on potential joint gains and whether the agreement is self-enforcing. Although acknowledging that "collaboration is more reliable when agreement is self-enforcing," they view the Paris Agreement as a sub-optimal governance structure and claim that collaboration needs to be deepened with binding rules as confidence grows. Thus, the experience under the post-Paris system will guide whether costly binding mechanisms need to be devised as Keohane & Victor (2016) argued, or internalization of the global climate norms can make enforcement mechanisms redundant.

There are competing views on why states comply with global norms. On the one hand, rationalists view sanctions or penalties as the main cause of states' compliance. That is, norms *constrain* states' choices in the sense that states are likely to choose the second-best option because norms modify the cost and benefit calculations of non-compliance. "Integrated with this ontology is a cost/benefit choice mechanism, with agents calculating in response to putative regime benefits (material or social) or the threat of sanctions" (Checkel, 2001, p. 556). According to rationalists, states choose to comply when compliance produces the highest payoff by increasing the cost of non-compliance due to the sanctions, penalties, societal pressures from below, as well as reputational costs (Checkel, 1997, p. 477), rather than because states change their preferences by internalizing norms. "While liberals claim that norms constrain states' behaviour, they do not believe that norms can change states' preferences/identities/interests" (Checkel, 1997, p. 473).

On the other hand, constructivists believe that norms can change the actors' identities which then can lead to changes in their preferences and interests. Fundamental to constructivism is the proposition that human beings are social beings, and we would not be human but for our social relations. In other words, social relations make or construct people into the kind of beings that we are. Conversely, we make the world what it is, from the raw materials that nature provides (Onuf, 1998). This social aspect of potential transformation of conflictual interstate relationships can be termed socialization. Socialization is a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community, with compliance based on the internalization of these new norms. Thus, states, in adopting community rules associated with international organizations and institutions, switch from following the logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness; this adoption is sustained over time and is quite independent from a particular structure of material incentives or sanctions. The classical, sociological definition of socialization is "the process by which actors internalize the expectations of behavior imparted to them by the social environment" (Checkel, 2005, p. 804). Therefore, constructivist states would comply because it is in their best interest to do so, even if complying with norms incur costs.

The governance implications of the two competing views are distinct. If the rationalist perspective is correct, a high degree of regulations and enforcement mechanisms would be required. If the views of constructivists correlated more closely with reality, then the bottom-up, voluntary governance structure, as with the Paris Agreement, would be more effective for a climate change regime. This is because voluntary governance can facilitate wider engagement in response to the challenges of the Tragedy of the Commons. The evolution of global climate governance to date, and the new regime under the Paris Agreement, presents an interesting case to examine this divergence. The climate rules and regulations under the top-down Kyoto Protocol did not, in effect, enter into force, as some of the major emitters from the developed world refused to comply and other major emitters from the developing world were exempted from the responsibility to comply. Therefore, if states change their domestic policies even though they are costly, one can rebut the rationalists claim. Furthermore, if states modify their policies in line with their pledges under the post-Paris system, it becomes possible to reject the rationalist claim that states respond to material incentives only, and that norms do not have causal influences unless international rules specify penalty mechanisms.

It remains to be seen how effective the Pledge and Review system will be in inducing domestic policy changes. Nonetheless, the experiences up until the Paris Agreement have sufficiently illustrated the important role of norms and socialization. The voluntary nature of the Paris Agreement helped significantly to reach a global agreement in the face of the challenge of the Tragedy of the Commons. Once inter-state agreement has been achieved, the next concern to reduce emissions would be to implement the agreements in each state as domestic policy. However, triggering domestic policy changes requires domestic politics and domestic socialization be taken into account. If every state which ratifies the treaty is free from conflict in their domestic arena, the "states as unitary actors" assumption would hold, and the consideration of domestic politics would be redundant. Nonetheless, past experiences in climate change governance and policy-making clearly have

demonstrated otherwise. The next section will address some of the existing models of policy-formation that incorporate domestic politics and their implications will be applied to the issue of climate change.

Domestic Socialization: Civil Society in State-Society Relations

The Paris Agreement is a compromise developed to engage the main emitters with different levels of commitment to minimize the free-rider problem. In the absence of enforcement mechanisms, continuous commitment to global efforts through domestic policy changes can only be facilitated if climate norms are fully internalized into each party state, thereby making binding rules redundant. However, the climate norm diffusion is likely to take different courses from those for other issue areas such as human rights, as implementing global climate norms necessarily involves redistribution of domestic wealth and power. For this reason, domestic politics are more salient in the process of climate norm internalization. The solutions to the deviation of domestic climate policies from global norms may be found in the socialization and mobilization of domestic civil society by teaching agents new values and interests which can lead to "norm empowerment" (Checkel, 1997, p. 447). This section will discuss existing models of norm internalization processes, and their limitations in explaining climate norm diffusion. The analysis will also put forward the notion of bottom-up domestic socialization through civil society mobilization as a potential policy instrument.

Sikkink (2005) categorized international relations (IR) literatures depending on how domestic politics and the international system are addressed. Most studies which view states as unitary actors do not "grant primacy to domestic politics" (p. 153). Risse-Kappen (1995) likewise argued that

> there is a bifurcation in the international relations literature. Those who theorize about international relations and about domestic politics tend to ignore the linkages between societies and societal actors across national boundaries. Those who study transnational relations mostly neglect structures of governance in particular the state. An effort to renew the concept of transnational relations must try to bridge the gap. (p. 16)

The incorporation of domestic factors into the discussion of international politics is, in fact, essential to an understanding of how to facilitate the implementation of the global climate norms.

There are several strands of studies that factor in domestic elements in the discussion of international affairs. Much impetus has derived from the discussion of transnational actors in promoting global norms (e. g., Risse-Kappen, 1995; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Risse et al, 1999). The other strand of studies of domestic politics in the IR literature follows the discussion of the Putnam's (1988) two-level game metaphor. Despite the explanatory power of these conceptualizations and models with regard to many other issues, however, they are revealed to be somewhat limited with regard to the issue of climate change.

The first line of studies proposed several models of norm-diffusion into domestic politics under the social constructivist tradition, which focus more on the role of transnational actors and their coalition with domestic actors, rather than that of states. As Risse-Kappen (1995, p. 5) pointed out, "the earlier arguments set up the controversy in terms of a 'state-centered' versus a 'society-dominated' view of world politics," leading to the distinct development of research programs in the two areas of states and societal actors. Keck and Sikkink (1998) discussed the boomerang effect, where non-state actors, faced with oppression and blockage at home, seek state and non-state alliances in the international arena, which, when successful, can bring pressure to bear upon a government to carry out domestic political change. Risse and Sikkink (1999) expanded this concept into the spiral model, which integrated the boomerang effect into a more dynamic five stages of the effects of domestic transnational linkages on domestic political change. Risse et al. (1999) investigated the different patterns of internalization of human-right norms into domestic practices, in different countries in different continents, and identified the conditions under which international

human rights norms are internalized. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) discussed the lifecycle of norms and argued that domestic politics matter only at the early stages in the norm dynamics, with its influence decreasing once norms become institutionalized and internalized. Sikkink (2005) categorized dynamics of multi-level governance by the degree of the openness of the international structure and domestic structure, and developed the inside–outside coalition model that can be applied for the case in which both the international and domestic structures are open.

These models presume domestic socialization in a top-down manner: transnational advocacy networks form coalitions with domestic groups in order to influence target government elites, and norm diffusion starts by the socialization of the top elites into the global norm. The internalization of norms into the domestic arena will follow through changes in institutions such as legalization of the globally agreed norms. Norms indeed "cascade" from the top to the bottom. This approach certainly has the power to change domestic policy in many areas, nevertheless, it would have little use in climate norm diffusion, where domestic interest groups form coalitions to influence the administration and the legislature to achieve their own agendas. Depending on who has more bargaining power, varying domestic policy platforms would be adopted, possibly against the will of the majority. For the voluntary system to achieve the goal of limiting global temperature rise, all the main emitters should ratchet up their efforts. With the June 2017 departure of the US from the regime, however, the other main emitters have incentives to follow the American example, given the potential conflicts of interest among their domestic actors.

Analysis of US policy-making under both the Bush and Trump administrations reveals that the decisions to refuse to ratify or to withdraw were made possible not as a result of a lack of outside pressures. Rather, they were the results of agitation from alienated domestic constituencies and support from them for policy change away from global climate norms. Domestic constituencies were divided not only on whether to support global climate policy, but by how they were likely to be affected by the rules. So, the US withdrawal, and also potential opposition within other

actor states, comes about not as a result of the failure of elite socialization, but rather because of tensions among domestic constituencies. Such conflicts of interest need to be resolved domestically, and pressure to comply with the global norm should come from the inside and the bottom up; ideally through informed demonstrations and publics exercising their voting power.

While the first line of research has investigated primarily the processes of how outside pressures from transnational networks influence government elites' decisions, the other line of studies focuses more on how a state's position in the international arena is influenced by its domestic politics. In stark contrast to the traditional approach viewing states as unitary actors and which categorizes national policy decision-making as emanating from an enigmatic and inscrutable black box, Putnam's (1988) two-level game metaphor explains how a state's stance in the international negotiations in the first level, is influenced by the feasibility of ratification in the second level. Taking into account the possibility of re-election, the negotiation stances and the decision of whether to ratify will be affected by the stances of their constituencies. Political leaders are constantly playing in the domestic and international arenas simultaneously. They are trying to achieve their goals using these two arenas, and they face different pressures and constraints from each. Therefore, their behavior can only be understood when both internal and external factors are considered.

Despite the powerfully intuitive incorporation of domestic politics into foreign policy decision-making processes, there are limitations with regard to this approach in explaining climate change policies. Existing models based on two-level games pay more attention to coalition formation among interest groups who aim to influence the administration and the legislature, than to domestic socialization. Two-level games are unclear about the role of social movements by societal actors, which are particularly pronounced in the politics of climate change, when such groups may operate differently from other interest groups, and with distinct objectives. Furthermore, the subsequent change of identities or preferences and interests owing to socialization has not been modeled into the existing two-level games, which can be a major drawback

modeling global climate politics, considering the high explanatory power of socialization as is illustrated in this paper. More discussion on the limitations of modeling socialization using individualistic utility maximization can be found in other studies (Risse, 2000; Ruggie, 1998; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).

Distinct from the two strands of research on domestic factors in international politics outlined above, several other studies have allowed for bottom-up domestic socialization. These studies have emphasized domestic structures such as state-society relations as main factors that determine the impacts of international norms on domestic politics. Risse-Kappen (1995) characterized the domestic structure in terms of the nature of the domestic political institutions and that of society. Cortell and Davis (1996) suggested domestic context in terms of the structure of decision-making authority and patterns of state-society relations, and the domestic salience of the international norms as main factors of the influence of international institutions. Checkel (1997) singled out two norm diffusion mechanisms—societal pressure and elite learning—and domestic structures as intervening variable of four categories: liberal, corporatist, statist, and state-above-society. Checkel (1997) argued that domestic structures determine which norm diffusion mechanism will prevail. Haas (2002, p. 83), in his discussion of the causal mechanisms of domestic policy choices, also pointed out that "national administrative characteristics and domestic state/society relations" are key factors.

Although it is beyond the scope of this paper and the context and issue area of each study are different, commonly suggested domestic factors by these studies (Risse-Kappen, 1995; Cortell & Davis, 1996; Checkel, 1997) can be adopted in the analysis of identifying factors that foster the domestic operating environment to internalize norms and institutionalize the global climate norms into domestic policies. Risse-Kappen (1995) argued that both domestic structures and international institutions are factors that determine domestic policy change in line with the international norms. Therefore, failure to pay sufficient attention to the role and impact of domestic politics, focusing instead upon the search for viable international enforcement mechanisms, led to the failure in

Copenhagen. The Paris Agreement can be seen as a strategy of minimizing the constraints imposed by such international institutions as the Kyoto Protocol, focusing instead, on engaging every significant emitter in an effort to overcome the collective action problems of the Tragedy of the Commons. In the search for policy tools in the post-Paris era, therefore, given that neither international institutions nor governmental structures are under the control of activists, only societal aspects are left as a viable instrument.

Similar arguments have been made by Checkel (1997). Civil society empowerment, which can lead to norm empowerment, is the remaining policy instrument. As was discussed in the previous section, both liberals and constructivists claim norms matter, but for different reasons. Checkel said that "liberals argue that international norms affect the *incentives* facing societal actors and politicians; they constrain behavior" (1997, p. 473). However, the experiences from the global climate governance have taught that searching for a binding mechanism upon which all the members can agree is a very costly process, and indeed it failed to produce any effective results before COP 21 in Paris. Thus, the "incentives" that will make policy makers comply in the field of climate change should come from inside the country, from the bottom up, not from outside, through a top-down process of binding global rules. Under Checkel's (1997) categorization, a liberal domestic structure is least susceptible to the influence of elites, or subject to elite capture, which implies that under such conditions, domestic policies are more likely to consistently reflect the wishes of the people. One could examine how different countries under different categories identified by Checkel (1997) responded to global climate norms and derive further policy suggestions to consolidate the operation of the post-Paris governance structure.

Cortell and Davis (1996) added "domestic salience" of the international rule or norms to domestic structural context, where "domestic structure refers to the organization of decision-making authority and to the pattern of state-society relations" (p. 454). We can reach a similar conclusion that civil society empowerment can consolidate the operation of the Pledge and Review system of the Paris Agreement, as domestic salience of the global norms can be intensified

by granting more access to information through which empowerment of the civil society can be achieved. Given these observations, the remaining concerns under what conditions civil society can be empowered and mobilized to push for a swifter adaptation of the global climate norms and how to achieve such conditions. These will be left for future research.

Conclusion

Having observed the advancement of events in climate governance over the past two decades, one may want to revisit Finnemore's (1996, p. 1) question, "how do states know what they want?" The past decades of experience somewhat confirm Finnemore's (1996, pp. 1–33) argument that each state's behavior tends to converge as their national interest are modified with external pressures to comply with global norms. What Finnemore missed, however, is the role of internal pressures. Recognizing internal pressures and domestic constraints can also explain the deviation from global norms; through the understanding of which remedies to non-compliance can be devised. Domestic politics is more salient in climate change. In contrast with the issues discussed in Finnemore (1996) that dealt with UNESCO, the Red Cross, and the World Bank, climate change involves conflicts of domestic interests, and redistribution of costs and benefits disproportionately across populations. Worse, the public good nature of climate change has made binding rules more unattractive solutions.

The progress from the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris Agreement illustrates what future global climate governance may look like and how states could construct their interests. The external environments wherein states operate will be constructed through a complex web of interactions among many entities including both state and non-state actors. States' interests are also likely to be constructed through domestic politics on matters related to climate change. As Sikkink (2005, p. 158) pointed out,

> the combined types of domestic-international interactions provide a way of thinking about multilevel governance that is neither "top-down" nor "bottom-up," but a complex and dynamic

process of interaction of domestic politics and international politics. A two-level interacting political opportunity structure produces outcomes that would be counterproductive for those looking at domestic opportunity structure. For example, it is generally assumed that a state's capacity or propensity for repression will diminish domestic social movement activity.

In this sense, polycentricity is a description of the current status, as well as the prescription to the difficulties we face when it comes to climate change governance. That is, the evolution of climate governance has taken the form of polycentricity, at the same time, it has been the process of remedying the problems we face as some authors have recently argued (Cole, 2015; Jordan et al., 2015; Keohane & Victor, 2016). Ostrom (2012, p. 355) clarified a polycentric system as "one where many elements are capable of making mutual adjustments for ordering their relationship with one another within a general system of rules where each element acts with independence of other elements; a polycentric system exists when multiple public and private organizations at multiple scales jointly affect collective benefits and costs." Solutions to the problems require the engagement of civil society. As Ruggie (2004, p. 527) argued, "social capacity building" would be required and more formal efforts need to be exerted to develop and consolidate the "global public domain." In the Cardoso (2004) Report, the UN also endorsed the case for wider participation of civil society in all aspects of the work of the UN (see Willetts, 2006 for criticism of some of the findings of this report).

In relation to building up and strengthening the global public sphere, the communication and information technology (CIT) revolution poses both challenges and opportunities. The new media that technological advances have brought need to be carefully utilized for norm diffusion in the midst of the attempts by norm-defectors to mobilize forces for the support of their own agendas. Collective decisions for the global common good could be achieved when domestic politics is carefully taken into account in efforts to achieve the global goals. Institutionalization of the participation of domestic civil society in the

global discussion is one such solution. In the era of CIT revolution, more innovative ways of engaging civil society become feasible. Through this process, the global civil society that was discussed in Smith (1998, pp. 100–103) could manifest more, and whose continuous networking can accumulate "global social capital" that can beneficially be utilized when needed.

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