A De La Salle University professor who has examined political dynasties for over 25 years offers insights on why these have persisted and why the Philippines needs legislation to combat its threat to democracy.

“The most important promise of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is that the State shall provide equal opportunities for public service and ban political dynasties, as may be defined by law,” says Dr. Julio Teehankee, professor of Political Science and International Studies at De La Salle University. 

Yet across the country, power remains concentrated in the hands of a few families, shaping elections, governance, and development outcomes. To understand why political dynasties have not only persisted but also expanded over time, Teehankee has studied them since the 1998 elections—the period when the provision of the Constitution limiting the term of elected local and national officials kicked in. 

Over the course of his research, he has explored the intersections of history, institutions, and political incentives, eventually leading him to become a staunch advocate for the passage of an anti-political dynasty law, as mandated by the 1987 Constitution.

A system shaped to endure

Political dynasties, Teehankee explains, are not merely a recurring feature of Philippine politics—they are deeply embedded in how the system operates. “At the heart of the development question is actually power,” he emphasizes. “And when you speak of power, it is about politics.”

Drawing from historical institutionalism, he underscores how past decisions continue to shape present realities. He points out that the 1987 Constitution, drafted after the EDSA People Power Revolution, explicitly called for the banning of political dynasties. However, the definition of a political dynasty was left to Congress. 

He puts it bluntly: “I’ve always said that that was the fatal mistake of the framers of the Constitution, because by asking Congress to define political dynasties, that’s like asking Dracula to guard the blood bank. The House of Representatives is actually the house of clans or the house of dynasties, the nesting ground of political families, and they definitely will not legislate themselves out of power.”

Teehankee also notes that even well-intentioned reforms have reinforced the system. He explains that term limits, introduced to prevent the concentration of power, instead created openings for relatives to take over positions. “Originally, the term limit was meant to give equal opportunity, but the pathway opened for many relatives of politicians who were banned from seeking re-election.”

Drawing from a database of elected officials dating back to 1946, Teehankee mapped how these families have evolved across generations. Some have persisted for decades, even centuries, while others have faded and re-emerged. This persistence, he argues, is not simply about voter preferences but about structural constraints. 

Ultimately, dynasties function as a form of political monopoly. “Political dynasty is really about political monopoly,” he points out, comparing it to market systems where a lack of competition leads to poor outcomes. In the same way, limited political competition restricts accountability and narrows democratic participation.

Rebuilding democratic pathways

TWhile some point to development gains in areas led by political families, Teehankee cautions against oversimplifying the relationship. In cases where dynasties are tied to business interests, development may occur—but often for strategic reasons. “It is in their interest to promote economic development because it involves their business,” he explains, adding that access to services is then mediated through personal networks, which deepens dependency, rather than through institutional systems that strengthen public accountability.

For Teehankee, addressing this requires more than a single law. “The anti-political dynasty law is not the end-all and be-all,” he stresses, adding that what is needed is a broader package of political and electoral reforms that address the structural roots of the problem.

Central to this is the strengthening of political parties and addressing party switching. “Without strong institutions, politics remains centered on personalities, families, and patronage.”As he observes, while surnames remain constant across decades, party affiliations frequently change, hence further proving that political loyalty often lies with families rather than institutions. He further stresses that reforms must also lower entry barriers into politics, as high campaign costs exclude new and capable leaders, particularly younger generations.  

The persistence of political dynasties raises deeper questions about democracy and inclusion. For Teehankee, the role of research goes beyond analysis. “Research should not really be just for academics,” he reflects. “There is an imperative to push for the much-needed reforms that this country badly needs.”

SDG: 4, 10, 16